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FOURTH CIRCUIT REVIEW
Section 8 tenants. 9 The Fourth Circuit clearly has expressed that the




A. Abolition of Interspousal Immunity in Admiralty Torts
Article III, section two of the United States Constitution provides
the basis for admiralty jurisdiction.1 The federal district courts exercise
original jurisdiction in maritime cases.' Courts sitting in admiralty must
"I See 675 F.2d at 1344 (landlord may not evict Section 8 tenants in retaliation or ar-
bitratily); supra note 72 (proscription against arbitrary and retaliatory actions).
' 675 F.2d at 1348.
U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. The United States Constitution extends admiralty jurisdic-
tion to all cases in law and equity involving maritime law. Id.
2 28 U.S.C. § 1333 (1976). Admiralty jurisdiction extends to persons and ships claiming
damages for torts and breach of contract.Exparte Easton, 95 U.S. 68,68-73 (1877). Admiralty
law covers both interstate and foreign commerce. London Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 279
U.S. 109, 124 (1928). District courts exercise admiralty jurisdiction over both commercial
and recreational navigation. Id. at 123-25. The general requirement for admiralty jurisdic-
tion is that the claim must arise on the navigable waters of the United States. The
Plymouth, 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 20, 36 (1866). For the purposes of admiralty jurisdiction,
navigable waters are any waterways that are usable as arteries of commerce. Adams v.
Montana Power Co., 528 F.2d 437, 440 (9th Cir. 1975). Navigable waters include oceans,
lakes, and rivers. Lee v. Licking Valley Coal Digger Co., 209 Ky. 780, 781, 273 S.W. 542, 543
(1925).
Maritime law has evolved through the common law of the world's commercial nations.
Guerrido v. Alcoa S.S. Co., 234 F.2d 349, 352 (1st Cir. 1956). Maritime law essentially inter-
twined with international law. Id. The international nature of admiralty necessitates the
uniform development of maritime law. Id. One of the purposes of the framers of the con-
stitution in establishing admiralty jurisdiction was to insure uniform application of maritime
rules throughout the United States. Id. The district courts establish and enforce maritime
rules that are applicable throughout all of the districts under United States admiralty
jurisdiction. Id. District court opinions in admiralty cases have greater precedential value
outside the district than district court opinions for cases not in admiralty jurisdiction. Id.
Admiralty jurisdiction, therefore, differs from other forms of jurisdiction. Id.
Admiralty law is not a complete and self-contained system. Just v. Chambers, 312 U.S.
383, 388 (1941). In the absence of clear precedent from maritime law or rules, courts look to
state law for guidance. Id. State and common law principles, however, are not binding on ad-
miralty courts. Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205,215 (1917). If an admiralty court
finds state or common law inappropriate, the court may fashion a new rule to adjust to the
changing needs of society and maritime commerce. Kermarec v. Compagnie Generale Trans-
atlantique, 358 U.S. 625, 628 (1959).
Originally, admiralty jurisdiction did not depend upon the nature of the activity. St.
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balance the national policy of uniformity in maritime laws3 with the par-
Hilaire Moye v. Henderson, 496 F.2d 973, 976 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 884 (1974).
The locality of the incident was the basis for jurisdiction. See, e.g., Victory Carriers, Inc. v.
Law, 404 U.S. 202, 205 (1971) (longshoreman injured by forklift on pier not entitled to
maritime jurisdiction); Grant Smith-Porter Ship Co. v. Rohde, 257 U.S. 469, 476 (1922) (ad-
miralty jurisdiction upheld where workman suffered injuries while constructing un-
completed vessel harbored on navigable waters); Weinstein v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 316
F.2d 758, 761 (3d Cir. 1963) (locality is sole jurisdiction test where aircraft crashes into
navigable waters).
The Supreme Court questioned the wisdom of a pure locality test in Executive Jet
Aviation, Inc. v. City of Cleveland. 409 U.S. 249, 261 (1972). In Executive Jet, the Court
found that an airplane crash in navigable waters did not bear a sufficient relationship to
traditional maritime activity to invoke admiralty jurisdiction. Id. at 268. Even before Ex-
ecutive Jet, some courts found that admiralty jurisdiction depended on a combination of the
locality requirement and the inquiry of whether the claim had a significant relation to
maritime navigation and commerce. See, e.g., Peytavin v. Government Employees Ins. Co.,
453 F.2d 1121, 1127 (5th Cir. 1972) (admiralty jurisdiction denied where plaintiff suffered
whiplash injuries in automobile accident while waiting on a floating pontoon at ferry landing);
Chapman v. City of Grosse Pointe Farms, 385 F.2d 962, 966 (6th Cir. 1967) (no admiralty
jurisdiction where plaintiff dove from a pier into shallow water); Smith v. Guerrant, 290 F.
Supp. 111, 114-15 (S.D. Tex. 1968) (suit in admiralty dismissed where crane dropped forklift
into waters of harbor); McGuire v. City of New York, 192 F. Supp. 866, 868 (S.D.N.Y. 1961)
(admiralty jurisdiction disallowed for plaintiff's injuries on public beach).
' Winter v. Eon Prod., Ltd., 433 F. Supp. 742, 744 (E.D. La. 1976). Congress intended
that admiralty law should be uniform in order to conform with the laws of other maritime
nations in the interest of congenial international relations. Richards v. Blake Builders Supply,
Inc., 528 F.2d 745, 747 (4th Cir. 1975). Even if an action originates in state court, the fact
finder must turn to admiralty law to determine the rights and liabilities of those injured on
navigable waters. See Kermarec v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 358 U.S. 625, 628
(1959) (visitor fell down stairway on vessel berthed at pier); Carlisle Packing Co. v. San-
danger, 259 U.S. 255, 259 (1922) (plaintiff injured on motorboat on navigable waters).
The "saving to suitors" clause of 28 U.S.C. § 1333 (1976) creates an exception to the ex-
clusive admiralty jurisdiction of the federal district courts. Paduano v. Yamashita Kisen
Kabushiki Kaisha, 221 F.2d 615, 617 (2d Cir. 1955). All plaintiffs seeking remedies other than
admiralty remedies are entitled to bring action in state courts. Id. The purpose of the "sav-
ing to suitors" clause is to prevent deprivation of a choice of remedies and to allow full
recovery under common law principles. Ramos v. Beauregard, Inc., 423 F.2d 916, 918 (1st
Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 865 (1970). If a plaintiff brings a maritime action in federal court
based on diversity jurisdiction the uniform system of maritime law still governs the action.
Pope & Talbot, Inc. v. Hawn, 346 U.S. 406, 410-11 (1953). When a state law undermines a
federally granted admiralty right, the court must apply the law that follows the admiralty
principles of national uniformity. Bell v. Tug Shrike, 332 F.2d 330, 332 (4th Cir. 1964).
National uniformity in admiralty law is a constitutionally based principle. See Moragne
v. State Marine Lines, 398 U.S. 375, 402 (1970) (right to recover for wrongful death under
general maritime law); The Lottawanna, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 558, 575 (1874) (constitutional
basis for uniformity in admiralty). State law cannot contravene the characteristic uniformity
of admiralty law. St. Hilaire Moye v. Henderson, 496 F.2d 973, 980 (8th Cir.), cert. denied,
419 U.S. 884 (1974). Most contradictions with established admiralty principles that result
from application of state law constitute disruptions of international and interstate relations.
Id.; J. Ray McDermott and Co., Inc. v. Vessel Morning Star, 457 F.2d 815, 818 (5th Cir.) (en
banc), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 948 (1972). Even if the state law does not contradict directly an
established admiralty principle, the admiralty rule will preempt the state law to prevent
significant disruption of national uniformity. Alva S.S. Co. v. City of N.Y., 405 F.2d 962, 970
[Vol. 40:459
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ticular interests of the states.4 States traditionally govern the domestic
relations of domiciliaries of the state.5 Many states apply the doctrine of
interspousal immunity, a common law doctrine that prohibits lawsuits
between husband and wife, to prevent disruption of domestic relations.'
Since domestic relations traditionally have been within the province
of the states, state law controls the application of interspousal
immunity.' Circumstances, however, may require admiralty courts to
weigh the policy of national uniformity against the state's interest in in-
terspousal immunity.' The United States Supreme Court has not ad-
(2d Cir. 1969); see The Roanoke, 189 U.S. 185, 196-97 (1903) (court refused to impose state
lien on ship repairs); Currie, Federalism and the Admiralty: "The Devil's Own Mess," 1960
S. CT. REv. 158, 166-67 (sufficient disruption of admiralty uniformity precipitates preemp-
tion of state statutes). See also U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 (supremacy clause).
Winter v. Eon Prod., Ltd., 433 F. Supp. 742, 744 (E.D. La. 1976). State regulatory
power exercised with federal consent or acquiescence indicates congressional intent to
leave the regulated area within state control. See Wilburn Boat Co. v. Fireman's Ins. Co.,
348 U.S. 310, 314 (1955) (lack of congressional regulation of marine insurance contracts and
marine insurance warranties led to application of state law instead of federal admiralty
rule); infra text accompanying notes 43-45 (state law may apply in admiralty).
' DeSylva v. Ballentine, 351 U.S. 570, 580 (1956). Domestic relations include all mat-
ters of the family or household, including divorce, separation, custody, support, and adop-
tion. BLACK'S LAW DICTION'ARY 435 (5th ed. 1979). There is no federal law of domestic rela-
tions: DeSylva v. Ballentine, 351 U.S. at 580; Bell v. Tug Shrike, 332 F.2d 330, 334 (4th Cir.
1964). State law properly controls cases in admiralty when no maritime or explicit common
law exists on the issue and the state law does not disrupt commerce. 332 F.2d at 334. State
law normally governs familial relationships. Id. If the common law is incompatible with an
admiralty rule, policy, or custom, however, courts with admiralty jurisdiction may establish
a new administrative doctrine. Id. at 332. Where the issue is purely local, state law is the
proper authority for remedies and liabilities in the absence of a preempting federal statute
or judicially created rule. See, e.g., Kossick v. United Fruit Co., 365 U.S. 731, 738-39 (1961)
(verbal agreement for seaman to accept hospital care sufficiently related to maritime con-
cerns to be within admiralty jurisdiction); Romero v. International Terminal Operating Co.,
358 U.S. 354, 362 (1958) (admiralty law does not apply to claims against foreign shipowner);
Wilburn Boat Co. v. Fireman's Fund, 348 U.S. 310, 316-17 (1955) (state law governs marine
insurance contracts and warranties).
' Byrd v. Byrd, 657 F.2d 615, 618 (4th Cir. 1981). At one time, interspousal immunity
was the common law doctrine applied in all states. Id.; Lusby v. Lusby, 283 Md. 334, 335-36,
390 A.2d 77, 78-79 (Md. App. 1978). The doctrine of interspousal immunity was based on the
legal fiction that a man and woman become one person upon marriage. Lusby v. Lusby, 283
Md. at 335-36, 390 A.2d at 78-79. Any legal identity the female may have had as a single
woman became suspended during marriage. Id. at 335-36, 390 A.2d 78-79. The wife could not
sue or be sued without her husband's consent and without bringing suit in his name. Id. at
335-36, 390 A.2d at 78-79. The fiction of the husband and wife as "one flesh" made a tort be-
tween spouses morally and conceptually objectionable. Saunders v. Hill, 57 Del. 519, 520,
202 A.2d 807, 808 (1964).
' Simpson v. Simpson, 490 F.2d 803, 806 n.7 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 897 (1974);
see supra note 5 (states traditionally govern domestic relations); supra note 6 (interspousal
immunity).
8 Byrd v. Byrd, 657 F.2d 615, 617 (4th Cir. 1981); see also supra note 3 (admiralty
policy of national uniformity); supra notes 5 and 6 (state interest in interspousal immun-
ity).
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dressed whether interspousal immunity should apply to admiralty torts.'
In Byrd v. Byrd,"0 the Fourth Circuit considered whether interspousal
immunity applies within admiralty jurisdiction to prevent one spouse
from bringing a tort action against the other for injuries sustained in a
pleasure craft accident."
In Byrd, the plaintiff, Elsie Byrd, brought suit against her husband,
William Byrd, for negligence under admiralty and for negligent viola-
tions of the Federal Boat and Safety Act of 197112 and the Federal Inland
Navigation Rules. 3 The plaintiff was a passenger on the defendant's
cabin cruiser." Mrs. Byrd fell from a deck chair on the bridge of the boat
to the lower deck. 5 The plaintiff alleged that the defendant's negligence
in failing to fasten the chair to the bridge or to provide a guard rail caused
her to sustain severe and permanent injuries." The defendant conceded
that the court had jurisdiction" but denied any liability, asserting the
' See Byrd v. Byrd, 657 F.2d 615, 616 (4th Cir. 1981).
10 657 F.2d 615 (4th Cir. 1981).
" Id. at 616.
1 46 U.S.C. § 1461(d) (1976); see 657 F.2d at 616 n.3. The Federal Boat and Safety Act
of 1971 provides in part:
No person may use a vessel.., in a negligent manner so as to endanger the
life, limb, or property of any person. Violations of this subsection involving use
which is grossly negligent, subject the violator ... to the criminal penalties pre-
scribed in section 1483 of this title.
46 U.S.C. § 1461(d) (1976). Congress intended section 1461 to provide a private cause of ac-
tion for all violations of the enumerated prohibited acts. S. REP. No. 92-248, 92nd Cong., 1st
Sess. 2, reprinted in [1971] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 1333, 1342. The burden of going
forward then shifts from the plaintiff to the defendant to raise an affirmative defense. Id.
' 33 U.S.C. § 154 (1976) repealed by 94 Stat. 3435 (1980); 657 F.2d at 616 n.3. The
Federal Inland Navigation Rules are designed to prevent collisions on harbors, rivers and
other inland waters. 33 U.S.C. § 154 (1976) repealed by 94 Stat. 3435 (1980). The rules give
rise to a private cause of action for accidents occurring on navigable waters. Id.
" Brief for Appellant at 4, Byrd v. Byrd, 657 F.2d 614 (4th Cir. 1981) [hereinafter cited
as Brief for Appellant]; Brief for Appellee at 1, Byrd v. Byrd, 657 F.2d 615 (4th Cir. 1981)
[hereinafter cited as Brief for Appellee].
"s 657 F.2d at 616.
10 Id.
, Id. Admiralty jurisdiction has not always encompassed tortious injuries resulting
from pleasure boat accidents. See Crosson v. Vance, 484 F.2d 840, 842 (4th Cir. 1973). In
Crosson, the Fourth Circuit ruled that a claim which arose from a pleasure craft accident
had no relation to domestic or foreign shipping. Id. The Crosson court dismissed the per-
sonal injury claim for lack of a sufficient connection with shipping to invoke admiralty
jurisdiction. Id. at 843. The Fourth Circuit in Crosson, however, explicitly narrowed its decis-
ion to cases involving water skiers and not every pleasure craft case. Id. at 842.
Courts apply admiralty jurisdiction dpending on the particular circumstances of the
case. See, e.g., Executive Jet Aviation, Inc. v. City of Cleveland, 409 U.S. 249, 261 (1972)
(airplane crash in navigable waters insufficient for admiralty jurisdiction); Maryland v.
Amerada Hess Corp., 356 F. Supp. 975, 976-77 (D. Md. 1973) (airplane accidents provide no
basis for admiralty jurisdiction); Adams v. Montana Power Co., 354 F. Supp. 1111, 1113 (D.
Mont. 1973) (admiralty jurisdiction not applicable to boaters, water skiers, or fishermen on
dammed rivers). Some aviation accidents have a sufficient connection with shipping to fall
[Vol. 40:459
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doctrine of interspousal immunity as an affirmative defense.18
The District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia issued a
memorandum order granting the defendant's pretrial motion to dismiss
the case on the merits.19 The district court found that Virginia's interest
in family harmony outweighed the federal interest in a uniform national
rule of actions arising out of boat accidents involving married couples. °
The trial court based the decision on three basic tests.2" First, the
Virginia interspousal immunity doctrine must not conflict with a federal
statute.22 Second, the state rule must not conflict with a judicially
established federal admiralty rule.' Finally, Virginia's interest in in-
within admiralty jurisdiction. See, e.g., Higgenbotham v. Mobil Oil Corp., 357 F. Supp. 1164,
1167 (W.D. La. 1973) (helicopter performing crewboat functions crashed in Gulf of Mexico);
Hark v. Antilles Airboat, Inc., 355 F. Supp. 683, 687 (D.V.I. 1973) (flights by seaplanes over
international waters).
The current trend is toward per se admiralty jurisdiction for all pleasure craft ac-
cidents on navigable waters. See, e.g., Kelly v. Smith, 485 F.2d 520, 525 (5th Cir. 1973) (con-
siderations include functions and roles of parties, type of vehicles and instrumentalities,
causation and type of injury, traditional concept of the role of admiralty law, occurrence of
injury on navigable waters); Oppen v. Aetna Ins. Co., 485 F.2d 252, 257 (9th Cir. 1973)
(damage to pleasure craft from oil spill sufficiently interferes with right to navigate to in-
voke admiralty jurisdiction); Luna v. Star of India, 356 F. Supp. 59, 66 (S.D. Cal. 1973)
(vessel used as dockside museum sufficiently involved in maritime activity to invoke ad-
miralty jurisdiction).
The Supreme Court has accepted without discussion admiralty jurisdiction for pleasure
craft. See, e.g., Levinson v. Deupree, 345 U.S. 648, 652 (1953) (admiralty jurisdiction applied
to collision between two motorboats on the Ohio River); Coryell v. Phipps, 317 U.S. 406, 407,
412 (1943) (negligent agents of yacht owner held liable under admiralty jurisdiction); Just v.
Chambers, 312 U.S. 383,384-85 (1941) (owner of yacht entitled to cause of action in admiralty).
The federal government has an interest in protecting navigation and commerce on
navigable waters even if the pleasure craft is not engaged directly in commerce. St. Hilaire
Moye v. Henderson, 496 F.2d 973, 979 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 884 (1974). Any acci-
dent on navigable waters potentially could endanger passing vessels involved in commerce.
Id. Congress intended to include pleasure craft in admiralty jurisdiction. Motorboat Act of
1940, 46 U.S.C. § 526 (Supp. IV 1980). Federal safety and operational standards govern
pleasure craft as well as shipping vessels. Id.
The word "vessel" encompasses every type of watercraft or other artificial contrivance
capable of functioning as a means of transportation on water. 1 U.S.C. § 3 (1976). The term
"vessel" included any description of watercraft navigating on any sea, channel, lake or river.
46 U.S.C. § 713 (1976). The Admiralty Jurisdiction Act of 1925 further expanded maritime
jurisdiction to provide a cause of action when a vessel on navigable waters causes an injury
sustained or consummated on land. 46 U.S.C. § 740 (1976). For example, a workman injured
while repairing a vessel in drydock would have a cause of action in admiralty. See 46 U.S.C.
§ 740 (1976).
,8 657 F.2d at 616.




2 Civ. No. 80-860-N; see Wilburn Boat Co. v. Fireman's Ins. Co., 348 U.S. 310, 314
(1955). Courts have fashioned rules for admiralty where Congress has not acted or delegated
regulatory power to the states. Id. Judicially established admiralty rules should apply
19831
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terspousal immunity application cannot supersede any national need for
a new federal rule abolishing interspousal immunity in maritime tort ac-
tions. 4
The plaintiff in Byrd alleged that the Virginia interspousal immunity
doctrine conflicted with two federal statutes.' The district court held
that the purpose of section 221 of title thirty-three of the United States
Code 26 is to insure compliance with other admiralty rules, not to provide
a blanket prohibition against actions for negligence.Y Virginia's common
law doctrine therefore would not conflict with section 221.' The district
court also ruled that Virginia interspousal immunity would not conflict
with section 1461 of title forty-six of the United States Code.' The trial
court stated that any discrepancy between section 1461 and the Virginia
doctrine of immunity is too tenuous to bar interspousal immunity ap-
plication.2 The district court concluded that section 1461 addresses only
uniformly throughout the United States. Guerrido v. Alcoa S.S. Co., 234 F.2d 349, 352 (1st
Cir. 1956); see also supra note 2 (policy of national uniformity in maritime law). State law
cannot override judicially fashioned admiralty rules just as state law may not override
federal statutes. See Garrett Moore-McCormack Co., 317 U.S. 239, 249 (1942) (judicially
established rights implement the Merchant Marine Act which takes precedence over con-
flicting state law).
24 Civ. No. 80-860-N.
5 Id.
' Federal Inland Navigation Rules, 33 U.S.C. § 221 (1976) repealed by 94 Stat. 3435
(1980).
Civ. No. 80-860-N; see 33 U.S.C. § 221 (1976) repealed by 94 Stat. 3435 (1980). Section
221 provides that nothing in the Inland Rules can exonerate a vessel, shipowner or crew
from negligent conduct. 33 U.S.C. § 221 (1976).
' Civ. No. 80-860-N.
' Federal Boat Safety Act of 1971, 46 U.S.C. § 1461 (1976); Byrd v. Byrd, Civ. No.
80-860-N; see supra note 12 (46 U.S.C. § 1461). Section 1461 provides that no person may
negligently use a vessel in a way that endangers the life, limb, or property of any person. 46
U.S.C. § 1461 (1976).
' Civ. No. 80-860-N. Where the state is exercising its legitimate powers, the state
statute controls the area covered by the state statute in the absence of a clear congressional
intention to preempt state action. Steuart Transp. Co. v. Allied Towing Corp., 596 F.2d 609,
621 (4th Cir. 1979). A state statute based on police powers is not subordinate to federal law
unless Congress acts to regulate or control the area. See, e.g., Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co.,
435 U.S. 151, 157-58 (1978) (Federal Ports and Waterways Safety Act, 46 U.S.C. §§ 215, 364
(1976) preempts Washington tanker law regulating size and movement of oil tankers in
Puget Sound); Askew v. American Waterways Operators, Inc., 411 U.S. 325, 332 (1973)
(state statute imposing liability for oil removal costs applies since statute does not conflict
with Federal Pollution Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1161 (1976) (repealed 1982)). A congressional purpose
to preempt state regulation on a particular issue may arise in several ways. See Rice v. Santa
Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947) (licensing requirements under the Public
Utilities Act, 15 U.S.C. § 79 (1976 & Supp. V 1981)). The federal government may regulate
the area completely to disallow supplemental state regulation. Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Public
Service Comm'n, 250 U.S. 566, 569 (1919). Congress may act upon a field of dominant federal
interest precluding enforcement of state law on the issue. Even if the national government
has not foreclosed completely state legislation in an area, the federal law is controlling
where state and federal statutes or regulations conflict. Fla. Lime & Avocado Growers, Ins.
v. Paul, 372 U.S. 132, 142-43 (1963).
[Vol. 40:459
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criminal and civil penalties and does not govern private causes of
action 1
Before Byrd, no admiralty court had addressed the issue of in-
terspousal immunity.2 The district court, therefore, held that Virginia
interspousal immunity could not conflict with a judicially established
federal admiralty rule concerning interspousal immunity.' The district
court also ruled that Virginia's interest in preventing a tort suit by a liv-
ing person against his or her living spouse supersedes any national
policy of uniformity in the law of international and interstate relations. 4
Consequently, the district court in Byrd dismissed the suit on the
merits, applying interspousal immunity in admiralty tort.
On appeal, the Fourth Circuit reversed the district court's holding
that interspousal immunity bars tort suits between married parties
within federal admiralty jurisdiction 6 The Fourth Circuit used a two-
pronged test to reach its decision. First, the Byrd court discussed
whether a federal statute or judicially created federal admiralty rule
governs interspousal immunity application. 7 Second, since no statute or
rule controlled, the Fourth Circuit explored whether the court should
develop a new federal admiralty rule.' The Fourth Circuit did not find
any case or other authority addressing the application of interspousal
immunity in maritime law. 9 The question, therefore, became a choice
between following the existing Virginia interspousal immunity doctrine"
" Civ. No. 80-860-N.
See 657 F.2d at 616 (interspousal immunity in admiralty tort case of first
impression).
s Civ. No. 80-860-N.
Id. Interspousal immunity originally was designed to preserve marriage by prevent-
ing suits between spouses. Korman v. Carpenter, 216 Va. 86, 88, 216 S.E.2d 195, 197 (1975).
When one spouse murders another, however, the preservation of marriage becomes irrele-
vant. Id. The state of Virginia, therefore, refused to apply interspousal immunity in
wrongful death actions by the deceased spouse's estate against the living spouse. Counts v.
Counts, 221 Va. 151, 152-56, 266 S.E.2d 895, 896-98 (1980).
Civ. No. 80-860-N.
Byrd v. Byrd, 657 F.2d 615, 621 (4th Cir. 1981).
Id. at 617-21.
' Id.; see Wilburn Boat Co. v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 348 U.S. 310, 314 (1955) (ad-
miralty courts may fashion new rule if no statute or prior rule controls). An admiralty court
should not fashion a new admiralty rule if the applicable state law does not impair the
uniformity of admiralty principles or if some basic admiralty principle preempts the state
law. Moore v. Hampton Roads Sanitation Dist. Comm'n, 557 F.2d 1030, 1034 (4th Cir. 1976).
657 F.2d at 617.
40 Id. at 617. At the time of Byrd, Virginia applied interspousal immunity to all torts
except automobile accidents and wrongful death actions when one spouse killed the other.
Id. at 617 n.5; see, e.g., Counts v. Counts, 221 Va. 151, 152-56, 266 S.E.2d 895, 896-98 (1980)
(court used interspousal immunity to bar personal injury suit by husband against his divorced
wife); Korman v. Carpenter, 216 Va. 86, 88, 216 S.E.2d 195, 198 (1975) (court refused to apply
interspousal immunity where husband killed his wife and wife's estate brought suit); Sur-
ratt v. Thompson, 212 Va. 191, 194, 183 S.E.2d 200, 203 (1971) (interspousal immunity did not
prevent cause of action resulting from automobile accident). Virginia has abolished the in-
1983]
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or establishing a national rule governing interspousal immunity in
maritime tort actions. 1 The Byrd court was careful in considering for-
mulation of a new rule since any court exercising admiralty jurisdiction
may establish a rule providing strong precedent for every other admiralty
court in the interest of national uniformity.42
In Byrd, the Fourth Circuit recognized that a state law which in-
terferes with the basic admiralty principles of uniformity and simplicity
is not binding on parties in admiralty jurisdiction.43 Admiralty courts
look to state law in situations in which an overriding state interest ex-
ists.44 State law also applies in admiralty when the state law does not
contravene an established admiralty principle." The Fourth Circuit
refused to apply interspousal immunity in Byrd because the doctrine
would defeat an established meritorious maritime claim." The Byrd
court concluded that states apply interspousal immunity in different
ways.' If circuit courts exercising admiralty jurisdiction ruled according
to the applicable state interspousal immunity doctrine, each case might
have a different result. 8 The lack of precedent would impair the admiralty
policy of uniformity.49
The Fourth Circuit expressed concern for future conflicts between
terspousal immunity doctrine in tort effective July 1, 1981. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-220.1
(Cum. Supp. 1981). Since the Fourth Circuit disposed of Byrd on the basis of admiralty law,
the court did not decide whether § 8.01-220.1 or the former Virginia interspousal immunity
doctrine applied. 657 F.2d at 617 n.5.
' 657 F.2d at 617.
42 Id. at 619. Where a judicially -fashioned rule of admiralty law exists, the rule will
prevail over conflicting state law. Bell v. Tug Shrike, 332 F.2d 330, 332 (4th Cir. 1964); see
supra note 23 (judicially established admiralty rules applied uniformly).
'3 657 F.2d at 617; see Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc., 398 U.S. 375, 402 (1970)
(right to recover for wrongful death under maritime law negates state remedial statutes);
Kermarec v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 358 U.S. 625, 631 (1959) (admiralty
jurisdiction does not accommodate licensee and invitee distinctions). Courts may apply state
law to supplement or modify admiralty law if the proposed state principle does not interfere
with admiralty uniformity. Just v. Chambers, 312 U.S. 383, 387-88 (1941); see Southern Pac.
Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 216 (1917) (state provisions covering stevedore's liability arising
from passengers' injuries interfere with maritime law).
" 657 F.2d at 619-20; see Wilburn Boat Co. v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 348 U.S. 310, 319
(1955). In Wilburn Boat, the Supreme Court found that states have an overriding interest in
regulating insurance. 348 U.S. at 319. The Wilburn Boat Court, therefore, ensured that
state regulatory power over marine insurance would continue by making state law control
instead of admiralty rules. Id.
'5 657 F.2d at 617; see supra note 23 (judicially established admiralty rules); supra note
30 (federal legislation preempts state law).
" 657 F.2d at 618; see St. Hilaire Moye v. Henderson, 496 F.2d 973, 980-81 (8th Cir.)
(Eighth Circuit refused to apply state boat guest statute because the law defeated maritime
right to recovery and disrupted admiralty uniformity), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 884 (1974).
17 657 F.2d at 618; see infra notes 62-64 and accompanying text (differing state applica-
tion of interspousal immunity).




state laws." The Byrd court recognized that at one time all states
uniformly applied interspousal immunity in tort.5' An increasing number
of states, however, are abrogating the doctrine of interspousal im-
munity.2 Some states have abolished interspousal immunity while other
states apply the doctrine only in certain types of cases. At the time of
Byrd, Virginia recognized two exceptions to the interspousal immunity
doctrine." The Virginia Supreme Court abolished interspousal immunity
in automobile accident torts where the plaintiff spouse claimed inten-
tional or gross negligence by the defendant spouse.5 The Virginia
Id. at 620-21. In Byrd, the vessel on which plaintiffs injury occurred sailed in the
Wachapreague Inlet, located between Virginia and Maryland. Brief for Appellant, supra
note 14, at 4. If the court had applied a state law, the Byrd court would have faced a possible
conflict between Virginia and Maryland common law or statutes. See Alva S.S. Co. v. City
of N.Y., 405 F.2d 962, 971 (2d Cir. 1969) (court did not apply municipal immunity because of
possible conflicts between New York and New Jersey law).
11 657 F.2d at 618; see infra notes 52, 62 & 63 and accompanying text (state treatment
of interspousal immunity doctrine).
' 657 F.2d at 618. At the time of Byrd, several jurisdictions had established an excep-
tion to interspousal immunity in torts arising out of automobile accidents. See, e.g., Lewis v.
Lewis, 370 Mass. 619, __, 351 N.E.2d 526, 532 (1976) (interspousal immunity no longer
bars personal injury suit by wife against husband for injuries sustained in automobile acci-
dent); Rupert v. Stienne, 90 Nev. 397, 401, 528 P.2d 1013, 1017 (1974) (doctrine of in-
terspousal immunity abandoned for automobile accident plan); Richard v. Richard, 131 Vt.
98, 100, 300 A.2d 637, 641 (1973) (interspousal immunity does not bar suit by spouse for per-
sonal injuries sustained while guest in spouse's automobile). Other courts abolished in-
terspousal immunity for intentional spousal torts. See, e.g., Windauer v. O'Conner, 107 Ariz.
267, 268, 485 P.2d 1157, 1158 (1971) (wife willfully and intentionally shot husband in head);
Klein v. Klein, 58 Cal.2d 692, 693, 376 P.2d 70, 72, 26 Cal. Rptr. 102, 104 (1962) (action by wife
against husband for broken leg); Self v. Self, 58 Cal.2d 683, 683-87, 376 P.2d 65, 65-69, 26 Cal.
Rptr. 97, 97-101 (1962) (husband assaulted wife and broke her arm); Lusby v. Lusby, 283 Md.
334, 344, 390 A.2d 77, 89 (1978) (husband forced wife's automobile off road then assaulted
and raped her); Flores v. Flores, 84 N.M. 601, 604, 506 P.2d 345, 348 (N.M. App. 1973) (hus-
band intentionally wounded wife with knife); Smith v. Smith, 205 Or. 286, 288, 287 P.2d 572,
574 (1955) (spouse may sue for intentional tort); Apitz v. Dames, 205 Or. 242, 252, 287 P.2d
585, 598 (1955) (wife's estate sued husband for intentional injuries); Bounds v. Caudle, 560
S.W.2d 925, 926 (Tex. 1977) (wife's estate may sue for wrongful death when husband inten-
tionally shoots wife).
I See supra note 52 (various state exceptions to interspousal immunity); infra notes 62
& 63 and accompanying text (states' positions on application of interspousal immunity).
I See infra notes 55 & 56 and accompanying text (exception to Virginia interspousal
immunity existing at time of Byrd).
Surratt v. Thompson, 212 Va. 191, 192, 183 S.E.2d 200, 202 (1971). In Surratt, a wife's
estate brought a wrongful death action against her husband for her death resulting from an
automobile accident between a car her husband was driving and a car a third person was
driving. Id. at 201. The Surratt court found that interspousal immunity did not bar the
wife's suit and a new jury should hear the evidence of the husband's per se negligence and
gross negligence. Id. at 202-03. See Note, The Legislative Abrogation of Interspousal Im-
munity in Virginia, 15 U. RICH. L. REV. 939, 942-43 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Abrogation
in Virginia] (Virginia's exception to interspousal immunity); supra note 40 (abrogation of
Virginia's interspousal immunity).
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Supreme Court also refused to apply interspousal immunity in wrongful
death actions. 6
To establish an easily ascertainable rule of maritime law, the Byrd
court refused to apply the Virginia doctrine of interspousal immunity. 7
The Fourth Circuit had the rule making authority to establish an excep-
tion to interspousal immunity in admiralty jurisdiction." The Byrd court
abolished interspousal immunity in admiralty actions. 9
The general trend among the states is toward abolishing in-
terspousal immunity. 0 As a matter of public policy, interspousal immunity
is an outmoded doctrine. 1 Some courts have rejected the notion that the
husband and wife are the same legal person.2 Other courts have found
that interspousal immunity does not always promote marital harmony.'
Korman v. Carpenter, 216 Va. 86, 88, 216 S.E.2d 195, 198 (1975). In Korman, a wife's
estate brought a wrongful death action against her husband for the fatal shooting of the
wife by the husband. Id. at 195. The Korman court reasoned that when one spouse
wrongfully terminates the marriage by killing the other, interspousal immunity should not
bar the suit since preservation of domestic harmony is no longer necessary. Id. at 198. See
supra Abrogation in Virginia, note 55, at 943-44 (abrogation of Virginia's interspousal im-
munity in wrongful death actions); supra note 40 (current state of Virginia's interspousal im-
munity).
s7 657 F.2d at 620.
Id. at 619; see supra note 23 (uniform application of judicially established admiralty
rules).
657 F.2d at 619-21.
657 F.2d at 618; see Abrogation in Virginia, supra note 55, at 939; supra text accom-
panying notes 55 & 56 (abrogation of interspousal immunity in Virginia); infra notes 60-64
and accompanying text (state trends in interspousal immunity).
" 657 F.2d at 621; see Surratt v. Thompson, 212 Va. 191, 194, 183 S.E.2d 200, 202 (1971)
(theory of man and woman as "one flesh" should not bar suits today); Immer v. Risko, 56
N.J. 482, 488, 267 A.2d 481, 484 (1970) (single legal identity of husband and wife is outmoded
concept).
62 See generally Johnson v. Johnson, 201 Ala. 41, 43-44, 77 So. 335, 337-38 (1917); Rains
v. Rains, 97 Colo. 19, 21-23, 46 P.2d 740, 742-44 (1935); Lewis v. Lewis, 370 Mass. 619,
351 N.E.2d 526, 529-30 (1976); Merenoff v. Merenoff, 76 N.J._535, 544-45, 388 A.2d 951, 960-61
(1978); Crowell v. Crowell, 180 N.C. 516, 517, 105 S.E. 206, 207 (1920); Courtney v. Courtney,
184 Okla. 395, 400-405, 87 P.2d 660, 665-70 (1938); Bounds v. Caudle, 560 S.W.2d 925, 926-28
(Tex. 1977); Richard v. Richard, 131 Vt. 98, 101, 300 A.2d 637, 641 (1973); Surratt v. Thomp-
son, 212 Va. 191, 192-93, 183 S.E.2d 200, 201-02 (1971); Freehe v. Freehe, 81 Wash.2d 183,
184-85, 500 P.2d 771, 773-75 (1972); Coffindaffer v. Coffindaffer, 244 S.E.2d 338, 343-44 (W.
Va. 1978); Wait v. Pierce, 191 Wis. 202, 205-206, 209 N.W. 475, 478-79 (1926).
' Johnson v. Johnson, 201 Ala. 41, 43-44, 77 So. 335, 337-38 (1917); Cramer v. Cramer,
379 P.2d 95, 97 (Alaska 1963); Self v. Self, 58 Cal. 2d 683, 685-86, 376 P.2d 65, 65-67, 26 Cal.
Rptr. 97, 99-100 (1962); Brown v. Brown, 88 Conn. 42, 43-44, 89 A. 889, 890-91 (1914); Lorang
v. Hays, 69 Idaho 400, 444-45, 209 P.2d 733, 736-37 (1949); Brooks v. Robinson, 259 Ind. 16,
19-20, 284 N.E.2d 794, 797-98 (1972); Brown v. Gosser, 262 S.W.2d 480, 484-85 (Ky. 1953);
Moulton v. Moulton, 309 A.2d 224, 228-29 (Me. 1973); Lusby v. Lusby, 283 Md. 334, 335-36,
390 A.2d 77, 78-79 (1978); Lewis v. Lewis, 370 Mass. 619, __ , 351 N.E.2d 526, 529-30
(1976); Hamilton v. Fulkerson, 285 S.W.2d 642, 644 (Mo. 1955); Rupert v. Stienne, 90 Nev.
397, 398-99, 528 P .2d 1013, 1015-16 (1974); Merenoff v. Merenoff, 76 N.J. 535, 544-45, 388 A.2d
951, 960-61 (1978); Flores v. Flores, 84 N.M. 601, 603, 506 P.2d 345, 347 (N.M. App. 1973);
Courtney v. Courtney, 184 Okla. 395, 400-405, 87 P.2d 660, 665-70 (1938); Apitz v. Dames, 205
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Courts no longer consider imposition of interspousal immunity
necessary to prevent fraud and collusion against insurance companies."
The Fourth Circuit recognized that insurance companies are usually the
real parties in interest where one spouse sues the other. 5 Abolition of in-
terspousal immunity in admiralty torts supports the general principle
that a tortious injury deserves a remedy."
Or. 242, 254-55, 287 P.2d 585, 598-99 (1955); Digby v. Digby, 388 A.2d 1, 3 (R.I. 1978); Scotvold
v. Scotvold, 68 S.D. 53, 55-56, 298 N.W. 266, 268-69 (1941); Bounds v. Caudle, 560 S.W.2d 925,
926-28 (Tex. 1977); Richard v. Richard, 131 Vt. 98, 101, 300 A.2d 637, 641 (1973); Korman v.
Carpenter, 216 Va. 86, 87-88, 216 S.E.2d 195, 197-98 (1975); Surratt v. Thompson, 212 Va. 191,
192-93, 183 S.E.2d 200, 201-202 (1971); Freehe v. Freehe, 81 Wash. 2d 183, 184-85, 500 P.2d
771, 773-75 (1972); Coffindaffer v. Coffindaffer, 244 S.E.2d 338, 343-44 (W. Va. 1978); Wait v.
Pierce, 191 Wis. 202, 205-06, 209 N.W. 475, 478-79 (1926).
See Korman v. Carpenter, 216 Va. 86, 87, 216 S.E.2d 195, 196 (1975) (every driver
should carry liability insurance). Every responsible driver carries liability insurance and ex-
pects the insurance company to pay in the event of the driver's negligence. Smith v. Kauff-
man, 212 Va. 181, 185-86, 183 S.E.2d 190, 194 (1971). If the insurance company pays for in-
juries to one spouse that the other spouse causes no disruption in family harmony results.
Id. Courts threaten marital relations and the policy underlying interspousal immunity by
refusing to allow an interspousal cause of action. Immer v. Risko, 56 N.J. 482, 489-90, 267
A.2d 481, 484-85 (1970). If the insurance company does not pay, an unexpected drain on the
family resources results. Id. Insurance companies search carefully for false and collusive
claims. Coffindaffer v. Coffindaffer, 244 S.E.2d 338, 343 (W. Va. 1978). Insurance companies
are not defenseless and do not require excessive protection by the courts. Id.
Byrd v. Byrd, 657 F.2d 615, 621 (4th Cir. 1981).
Kermarec v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 358 U.S. 625, 630 (1959). Under
the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment, a passenger in any vessel or vehicle
who is a spouse is entitled to the same protection under the law as any other passenger.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV; see Alexander v. Alexander, 140 F. Supp. 925, 929 (W.D.S.C. 1956)
(interspousal immunity should not bar recovery to a husband or wife who is a passenger).
Application of interspousal immunity is a selective application of tort liability that prevbnts
spouses with legitimate claims from recovering. St. Hilaire Moye v. Henderson, 496 F.2d
973, 980-81 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 884 (1974). Interspousal immunity interferes
with the national admiralty policy of recovery. See supra note 3 (uniform remedies in ad-
miralty).
Federal statutes and Coast Guard regulations govern the safety of vessels in navigable
waters. Richards v. Blake Builders Supply Inc., 528 F.2d 745, 747 (4th Cir. 1975). The owner
of a vessel owes a duty of reasonable care to all persons on board the vessel for legitimate
reasons. Kermarec v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 358 U.S. 625, 632 (1959). State
law should not defeat or narrow admiralty principles. Id.; see, e.g., Garrett v. Moore-
McCormack Co., 317 U.S. 239, 243-46 (1942) (seaman in Pennsylvania court under Merchant
Marine Act, 28 U.S.C. § 371 (1976) is free from state burden of proof standards); Bagrowski
v. American Export Isbrandtsen Lines, Inc., 440 F.2d 502, 506 (7th Cir. 1971) (federal
maritime law superseded Wisconsin Workmen's Compensation Act, Wis. STAT. § 102.03(2)
(1975) when shipowner asserted right to indemnification); Alva S.S. Co. v. City of N.Y., 405
F.2d 962, 970 (2d Cir. 1969) (shipowner not barred from implicating a uniform rule of ad-
miralty to defeat municipal immunity under state law); Kalmback, Inc. v. Insurance Co. of
State of Pa. Inc., 422 F. Supp. 44,45 (D. Alaska 1976) (shipowners could not obtain attorney's
fees under Alaska state lav in action under admiralty jurisdiction). The federal government
has left some regulatory power over admiralty matters to the states. See, e.g., Askew v.
American Waterways Operators, Inc., 411 U.S. 325, 343 (1973) (state law governing pollution
standards not in conflict with federal law); Wilburn Boat Co. v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 348
1983]
498 WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW
Admiralty principles provide broad recovery for torts occurring on
many types of vessels. 7 The Byrd decision reaffirmed the policy of
categorizing pleasure craft accidents as admiralty issues."8 The policy
fosters uniformity by allowing injured passengers on vessels in all
navigable waters to maintain a cause of action against the boat's owner
or operator. 9 Uniformity of decision is necessary since an increasing
number of people vacation in the navigable waters of states other than
their own." Admiralty jurisdiction removes all vessels from the govern-
ance of local or state concepts such as interspousal immunity.' Maritime
law covers both substance and procedure in admiralty torts.2 Only over-
riding state concerns should take precedence over the policy of uniformity
in admiralty law.7"
The admiralty policy of uniformity has defeated state concerns in
other instances. The Second Circuit, for example, has barred application
of municipal immunity in an admiralty suit arising out of a city's
negligent actions.74 In many areas, such as the New York Harbor,
municipalities are close geographically.75 Ordinances of different cities
might espouse different rules of recovery. The laws of the fifty states
U.S. 310, 314 (1955) (broad state power to regulate insurance companies and insurance con-
tracts).
"T See supra note 17 (admiralty jurisdiction includes many types of vessels on
navigable waters).
657 F.2d at 616-17; see supra note 17 (pleasure crafts fall within admiralty jurisdic-
tion).
,9 See supra note 2 (injured parties should recover in admiralty jurisdiction).
7 See supra Brief for Appellant, note 14, at 16-17 (uniformity in interspousal immunity
application prevents choice of law problems that impede a maritime right to recovery).
' See Armour v. Gradler, 448 F. Supp. 741, 744 (W.D. Pa. 1978) (admiralty jurisdiction
prevents application of New York substantive law).
" See Pope & Talbot, Inc. v. Hawn, 346 U.S. 406, 409 (1953) (Constitution gives both
substantive and procedural discretion to admiralty courts); Chelentis v. Luckenbach S.S.
Co., 247 U.S. 372, 381-82 (1918) (admiralty is a discrete system of law operating uniformly
throughout United States); Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 210 (1917)
(maritime law operates under procedural due process and equal protection principles); St.
Hilaire Moye v. Henderson, 496 F.2d 973, 980 (8th Cir.) (federal admiralty jurisdiction is not
same as diversity jurisdiction, therefore admiralty applies own substantive law and pro-
cedures); cert. denied, 419 U.S. 884 (1974); Branch v. Schumann, 445 F.2d 175, 178 (5th Cir.
1971) (in exercising admiralty jurisdiction, courts must apply all substantive rules and pro-
cedures of maritime law).
" See supra notes 3 & 5 (courts should consider state concerns when there is no con-
flict with admiralty laws).
" Alva S.S. Co. v. City of N.Y., 405 F.2d 962, 970 (2d Cir. 1969). In Alva, a city fire com-
missioner negligently issued an order which caused an explosion on a ship on the New York
Harbor. Id. at 964. The Second Circuit in Alva, held that municipal immunity did not bar the
ship's suit against New York. Id. at 970. The Alva court based its decision on the need for
national uniformity in admiralty law. Id. at 971.




create varying exceptions to municipal liability." Application of conflict-
ing exceptions would impair national uniformity in maritime law." The
Supreme Court has refused to uphold state-created maritime liens on
ships 9 on the ground that state liens inhibit interstate commerce. 0 In
general, the Supreme Court tends to foster expanded liability and
discourage immunity from prosecution when statutes or rules imply a
substantial right to recovery."
Before Byrd, statutes, rules, and court decisions had never addressed
the application of interspousal immunity in admiralty torts.82 Courts
should be reluctant to change admiralty law or common law in the face of
possible changes which conflict with each other. 3 Uniformity for the
sake of uniformity serves no purpose if the new rule is harsh and incom-
patible with existing policy and practice. 4 Courts should fashion a new
rule for the purpose of uniformity only if uniformity would serve a valid
purpose.5
Arguably, interspousal immunity is a subject more appropriate for
resolution in the state or federal legislatures than for determination by
the courts.88 Legislatures are abrogating the doctrine of interspousal im-
munity for many reasons. 7 Courts and legislatures have recognized that
interspousal immunity no longer is necessary or even useful to preserve
the family unit.88 A husband and wife with sufficient motivation to bring
suit against a spouse probably is not interested in preserving har-
monious relations. Spouses colluding to collect insurance will suffer from
financial strain on the family resources if interspousal immunity bars the
7 Id.
78 Id.
7 The Roanoke, 189 U.S. 185, 194-97 (1902).
'Id.
See Pope & Talbot, Inc. v. Hawn, 346 U.S. 406, 410 (1953) (plaintiff had cause of action
in maritime law rather than Pennsylvania law that would apply contributory negligence as a
bar to recovery); Garrett v. Moore-McCormack Co., 317 U.S. 239, 243-46 (1942) (seaman had
more liberal burden of proof under admiralty law rather than stricter Pennsylvania stand-
ard). Old rules should yield to new standards reflecting changed circumstances. Worrell v.
Worrell, 174 Va. 11, 20, 4 S.E.2d 343, 346-47 (1939). Common law is adaptable to the re-
quirements of society. Courts must scrutinize applications of questionable common law doc-
trine such as interspousal immunity to see if changing times require new standards. Kor-
man v. Carpenter, 216 Va. 86, 87-88, 216 S.E.2d 195, 197 (1975).
Byrd v. Byrd, Civ. No. 80-860-N (E.D. Va. January 6, 1981) (mem.).
Bell v. Tug Shrike, 332 F.2d 330, 332 (4th Cir. 1964).
uId.
"See supra note 3 (uniformity in admiralty law).
Byrd v. Byrd, 657 F.2d 615, 619 (4th Cir. 1981).
" See infra text accompanying notes 88 & 89 (policy reasons for the abrogation of in-
terspousal immunity).
" See supra note 6 (interspousal immunity doctrine); supra note 64 (interspousal im-
munity can damage marital harmony).
1983]
WASHINGTON AND LEE LA W REVIEW
suit.89 Financial difficulties disrupt harmonious conjugal relations,
defeating the doctrine of interspousal immunity's stated goal of preserv-
ing marital harmony.
The purported state interest in governing marital relations is subor-
dinate to the national interest in admiralty law uniformity. Congress
has not disclaimed specifically any preemption of state interspousal im-
munity statutes.91 The Fourth Circuit, therefore, was justified in exercis-
ing rulemaking power to eliminate maritime interspousal immunity in
the interest of national unity. 2
The Byrd decision will have several ramifications within the Fourth
Circuit and the United States. A court sitting in admiralty probably will
not apply interspousal immunity in tort."3 The Fourth Circuit tacitly en-
couraged the abolishment of interspousal immunity. 4 The Byrd court
followed the trend toward less stringent state controls over domestic
relations. The Byrd decision may encourage Congress to institute a
more comprehensive body of maritime law. Finally, the Fourth Circuit
has encouraged suits between husband and wife for injuries sustained in
pleasure craft accidents.
The Fourth Circuit's decision in Byrd was a result of the trend
among the states toward abolishing interspousal immunity. 7 As in-
terstate and international travel become more common, the interest in
national uniformity in admiralty law supersedes state interest in con-
trolling interspousal immunity. 8 The Byrd decision furthers freedom to
sue among spouses.
MARY TERESA MILLER
" See supra note 64 (interspousal immunity and insurance fraud).
" See supra note 3 (uniformity in admiralty law); supra note 5 (state interest in govern-
ing domestic relations).
" Byrd v. Byrd, 657 F.2d 615, 616 (4th Cir. 1981); see supra note 30 (Congressional
preemption of state regulatory power).
"2 See supra note 3 (uniformity in admiralty law); supra note 23 (judicially established
admiralty rules).
See Byrd v. Byrd, 657 F.2d 615, 621 (4th Cir. 1981). The Fourth Circuit in Byrd held
that interspousal immunity does not apply within admiralty jurisdiction. Id.
" See 657 F.2d at 618 (trend toward interspousal immunity abolishment); supra text
accompanying notes 51-53, 60-66 (abrogation of interspousal immunity).
"s See 657 F.2d at 618 (Virginia has abolished interspousal immunity); see also supra
note 40 (history of Virginia interspousal immunity abrogation).
98 See 657 F.2d at 621 (Byrd court abolished interspousal immunity in admiralty tort);
supra note 17 (pleasure craft incluqed in admiralty jurisdiction).
" See supra note 40 (Virginia no longer applies interspousal immunity). See generally
supra text accompanying notes 51-66.
"8 See generally supra notes 3 and 5 (uniformity in maritime law and state interest in
interspousal immunity).
[Vol. 40:459
FOURTH CIRCUIT RE VIE W
B. Divided Damages Includes Settlements
Made To Servicemen
Under admiralty law, the divided damages rule in mutual fault colli-
sions requires allocation of damages between the responsible vessels.1
Admiralty doctrine traditionally has provided that mutual wrongdoers
pay personal injury and property damages inflicted on innocent third
parties.2 In Ionian Glow Marine, Inc. v. United States,' the Fourth Cir-
' See The Schooner Catharine v. Dickinson, 58 U.S. (17 How.) 170 (1854). In The
Schooner Catharine, the Supreme Court expressly approved the doctrine of equal division
of damages in mutual fault collisions. Id. at 178. The rule of divided damages in maritime
collisions dates back to ancient history. See Staring, Contribution and Division of Damages
in Admiralty and Maritime Cases, 45 CALIF. L. REV. 304, 306 (1957) (discussion of evolution
of divided damages). The divided damages rule existed long before the rule appeared in the
* early maritime codes. Id. See generally Owen, The Origins and Development of Marine Col-
lision Law, 51 TUL. L. REV. 759 (1977).
In American jurisprudence, the rules of admiralty generally follow English precedent
regarding fault. See G. GILMORE & C. BLACK, THE LAW OF ADMIRALTY § 704, at 492 (2d ed.
1975). When neither vessel is at fault in a collision, each must pay its own loss with no liability
attaching to either. See The Clara, 102 U.S. 200, 203 (1880); The Lepanto, 21 F. 651, 655
(S.D.N.Y. 1884). When fault in a collision is attributable to only one of the vessels, that
vessel must bear its own loss and pay a share of the damages of the other vessel as well. See
The Clara, 102 U.S. at 203; Oaksmith v. Garner, 205 F.2d 262, 266 (9th Cir. 1953). When the
fault of both vessels causes the collision, the settlement results in a division of damages
which under old law was an equal division. See The Chattahoochee, 173 U.S. 540, 549 (1899);
The Schooner Catharine v. Dickinson, 58 U.S. (17 How.) 170, 178 (1854).
The Supreme Court replaced the traditional divided damges rule with a proportionate
fault doctrine based on a sliding scale of percentages, although the rule still retains the
name of divided damages. United States v. Reliable Transfer Co., 421 U.S. 397, 411 (1975).
The proportionate fault doctrine attempts to determine more precise degrees of fault in col-
lision cases since the old divided damages doctrine often resulted in an unjust allocation of
damage. Id. at 410-11.
After the Brussels Collision Liability Convention of 1910, the proportionate fault doc-
trine emerged as the primary international rule in calculating damages in collisions. See
Comment, The Difficult Quest for a Uniform Maritime Law: Failure of the Brussels Con-
ventions to Achieve International Agreement on Collision Liability, Liens, and Mortgages,
64 YALE L.J. 878, 880 (1955). The proportionate fault rule gained acceptance everywhere ex-
cept the United States. Id. The United States finally assented to the more equitable method
of apportioning damages in Reliable Transfer. See 421 U.S. at 411. See generally Healy &
Koster, Reliable Transfer Co. v. United States: Proportionate Fault Rule, 7 J. MAR. L. &
COM. 293 (1975).
2 See Halcyon Lines v. Haenn Ship Ceiling & Refitting Corp., 342 U.S. 282, 284 (1952).
In Halcyon Lines, the Supreme Court held that in mutual fault collisions at sea, the mutual
wrongdoers must compensate third parties not at fault. Id. The historic rule of divided
damages still applies as a comparative fault doctrine in collision cases. See United States v.
Reliable Transfer Co., 421 U.S. 397, 411 (1975); Nutt v. Loomis Hydraulic Testing co., 552
F.2d 1126, 1132 (5th Cir. 1977); see also The Atlas, 93 U.S. 302, 319 (1878). In The Atlas, the
Supreme Court ruled that in a case of collision the accurate and equitable measure of com-
pensation to an innocent third party, a party not at fault in the collision, is damages to the
full amount of the third party's actual loss. Id.
3 670 F.2d 462 (4th Cir. 1982).
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cuit considered whether a divided damages apportionment includes
payments made to Navy personnel injured in a collision.4 The Fourth Cir-
cuit held that the owner of one of the responsible vessels in a mutual
fault collision may include payments made to injured Navy personnel as
part of the divided damages.'
The Ionian Glow case arose from a collision in fog in United States
territorial waters between a Greek cargo ship, the M/V Star Light, and a
United States Navy vessel, the Francis Marion.' Both ships sustained
substantial damage,7 and three crewmen aboard the Francis Marion suf-
fered injuries in the collision Ionian Glow Marine, Inc., owner of the
M/V Star Light, instituted an action pursuant to the Public Vessels Act 9
seeking exoneration from or limitation of liability." Both parties,
however, agreed on their respective degrees of fault in the collision,"
leaving the issue of damages to the judgment of the district court. 2 In
addition, Ionian Glow settled the personal injury claims brought by the
three crewmembers of the Francis Marion." As part of its alleged
damages against the United States, Ionian Glow tried to include the set-
tlement of the claims brought by the three injured servicemen. 4 The
district court, however, denied the inclusion of the servicemen's settle-
ment in Ionian Glow's share of the damages.' 5
The district court agreed with the Government's contention that the





' Id. Two Navy officers and one enlisted man on board the Francis Marion suffered in-
juries. Id. The record fails to disclose the extent of the injuries. Id.
' 46 U.S.C. §§ 781-90 (1976). The Public Vessels Act provides that the United States
bears the same tort liability as imposed by admiralty on a private shipowner. Id. § 781; see
Canadian Aviator, Ltd. v. United States, 324 U.S. 215, 228 (1944) (Supreme Court applied
Public Vessels Act in finding United States liable as shipowner).
" 670 F.2d at 463.
" Id. In settling the respective percentages of fault out of court, the parties im-
plemented the divided damages rule through a mutual agreement of liability. Id. Ionian
Glow agreed to pay 65% of the government's damages and the government agreed to pay
35% of Ionian Glow's damages. Id.
12 _Id.
" Id. Ionian Glow settled the suit with the servicemen for $700,000. Id. The Veteran's
Benefits Act ordinarily provides a compensation scheme for servicemen injured while per-
forming their regular duties. 38 U.S.C. § 331 (1976); see Complaint of Ionian Glow Marine,
Inc., 510 F. Supp. 196, 197 (E.D. Va. 1981). The district court refused to permit the inclusion
of the servicemen's settlement in the division of damages. 670 F.2d at 463; see also infra
text accompanying notes 25-28 (discussion of district court's holding).
" 510 F. Supp. at 197; see infra text accompanying notes 25-28 (discussion of district
court's holding).
"' 670 F.2d at 463; see infra text accompanying notes 25-28 (discussion of district
court's holding).
"8 340 U.S. 135 (1950).
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Stencel Aero Engineering Corp. v. United States7 should control the
case.2 8 In Feres, the Court held that the government bears no liability
under the Federal Tort Claims Act 19 for injuries to servicemen when the
injuries result from an activity incident to service." In Stencel Aero, the
Supreme Court extended the rule in Feres to include third parties." The
Court held that an injured third party cannot recover in an indemnity ac-
tion against the United States when the third party is a serviceman.
2
The Stencel Aero Court reasoned that a third-party indemnity claim
would circumvent the military compensation scheme under the
Veteran's Benefits Act by subjecting the government to the broad
liability the Act sought to limit.' The compensation scheme provides a
swift, efficient remedy for injured servicemen as well as an upper limit
of liability for the government in service-related injuries.
24
The district court applied the rationale of Feres and Stencel Aero to
" 431 U.S. 666 (1977).
607 F.2d at 463.
See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346, 2671-80 (1976) (applicable provisions of Federal Tort Claims
Act).
340 U.S. at 141-45. A primary purpose of the Federal Tort Claims Act was to
transfer from Congress to the courts the burden of examining tort claims against the
government. Id. at 139. Congress established a comprehensive system of relief authorized
by statute for military and naval personnel. Id. at 140; see 38 U.S.C. §§ 321, 331 (1976) (pro-
visions of the Veteran's Benefits Act).
21 431 U.S. at 673. In Stencel Aero, the Supreme Court reasoned that permitting
soldiers on active duty to bring suits against the United States would deteriorate military
discipline. Id. The Court stated that actions requiring members of the armed services to
testify on each other's decisions encourages the second-guessing of military orders. Id.
" 431 U.S. at 672. The Stencel Aero Court considered three primary factors in prevent-
ing the inclusion in Stencel Aero's damages of the payments made to the injured ser-
vicemen. First, a distinctly federal relationship exists between the government and
members of the armed forces. Id.; see United States v. Standard Oil Co., 332 U.S. 301, 305-06
(scope, nature, legal incidents, and consequences of relations between persons in service and
government derive from federal sources and adhere to federal authority). Second, the
Veteran's Benefits Act establishes, as a substitute for tort liability, a statutory no-fault com-
pensation scheme which provides pensions to injured servicemen without regard to any
negligence attributable to the government. 431 U.S. at 673; see 38 U.S.C. § 331 (1976). Third,
the institution of suits under the Federal Tort Claims Act might detract from the military
discipline inherent in the special relationship between a soldier and his superiors. 431 U.S.
at 673; see 28 U.S.C. § 2671 (1976).
' 431 U.S. at 673-74. In Ionian Glow, the Fourth Circuit recognized the basic dif-
ference between common-law tort suits and admiralty. 670 F.2d at 463. In an indemnity suit,
the burden of payment for the entire loss shifts from one tortfeasor compelled to pay
damages to the shoulders of another, more blameworthy tortfeasor. See W. PROSSER, HAND-
BOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 51 (4th ed. 1971). In contribution suits, tortfeasors distribute
the loss by requiring each to pay his proportionate share. Id. See generally Leflar, Con-
tribution and Indemnity Between Tortfeasors, 81 U. PA. L. REv. 130 (1932). In admiralty
suits, the established principles of maritime law prevail over the common law. 670 F.2d at
463; see infra notes 49-52 (discussion of distinction between common law and admiralty).
24 431 U.S. at 673. The Veteran's Benefits Act provides a quick, efficient remedy by
allowing servicemen to process administrative claims without going through the expense
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prevent Ionian Glow from including any payments to the injured ser-
vicemen in the damages." The district court reasoned that the ser-
vicemen's exclusive remedy against the government was a compensation
claim under the Veteran's Benefits Act.26 The Act provides for a ceiling
on the liability the government might incur for service-related injuries.'
The district court found that the inclusion of payments made to the ser-
vicemen would circumvent the government's limitation of liability and
frustrate a central purpose of the Act by allowing recovery beyond that
ceiling. 8
On appeal, the Fourth Circuit summarily rejected the application of
Feres and Stencel Aero to the Ionian Glow case.' Feres and Stencel
Aero involved actions under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA),30 but
Ionian Glow involved the Public Vessels Act, a statute confining collision
litigation to the applicable maritime law.2 The Fourth Circuit recognized
that the exceptions and limitations applicable under the FTCA bear no
weight in admiralty claims." In addition, the Fourth Circuit recognized
and time of protracted litigation. Id.; see 38 U.S.C. §§ 301-62 (1976). The Act also limits the
government's exposure to liability. 431 U.S. at 673; see 38 U.S.C. § 314 (1976) (clearly defined
rate schedule of compensation showing extent of government's liability).
' 670 F.2d at 463.
Id.; see 38 U.S.C. § 331 (1976) (provides disability benefits to servicemen for injuries
suffered or disease contracted in line of duty).
' See 38 U.S.C. § 314 (1976); 431 U.S. at 673 (discussion of Supreme Court's reasoning
regarding limitation of liability as specified under the Veteran's Benefits Act). The
Veteran's Benefits Act provides for specific payment guidelines which the government
must follow, thus assuring a ceiling on liability. See 38 U.S.C. § 322 (1976).
510 F. Supp. at 200; see supra note 27 (description of one particular purpose of
Veteran's Benefits Act).
670 F.2d at 463.
30 Id.; see 28 U.S.C. § 2674 (1976). The Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) precludes
recovery for servicemen injured in activity incident to service. See United States v. Brown,
348 U.S. 110, 112 (1954) (actionable cause for servicemen exists when injury not incident to
service). Compare Brooks v. United States, 337 U.S. 49, 51 (1949) (recovery permitted under
Federal Tort Claims Act for injury not incident to service) with Feres v. United States, 340
U.S. 135, 146 (1950) (recovery denied under Federal Tort Claims Act for injury incident to
service). When injuries sustained by servicemen occur incident to service, federal compen-
sation laws provide the exclusive remedy. See 340 U.S. at 146. In Feres, the Supreme Court
recognized an essential difference in whether an injury occurs incident to a serviceman's duty.
Id. In construing the FTCA, the Feres Court reasoned that Congress did not intend soldiers
on active duty, injured incident to service, to sue under the FTCA. Id. at 142-43. Because of
the transient nature of servicemen's duties, Congress provided relief for injuries incident to
service under quick, efficient compensation statutes. Id. at 143; see also O'Neil v. United
States, 202 F.2d 366, 367 (D.C. Cir. 1953) (veteran receiving disability compensation could
not recover under FTCA); Pettis v. United States, 108 F. Supp. 500, 501 (N.D. Cal. 1952)
(FTCA creates no additional causes of action for those already covered by adequate compen-
sation).
670 F.2d at 463; see supra notes 22 & 27 (explanation of Veteran's Benefits Act).
670 F.2d at 463. A major exceptio under the FTCA involves the Feres and Stencel
Aero decisions. See 340 U.S. at 138, 146. The Feres Court found that the FTCA provides no
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that the Public Vessels Act applies exclusively to damages caused by a
public vessel of the United States.3 Since the Ionian Glow case involved
a mutual fault collision under the Public Vessels Act rather than an in-
demnity or contribution suit under another statute, the Fourth Circuit
did not apply Feres and Stencel Aero.3 4
The Fourth Circuit relied on the Supreme Court's decision in The
Chattahoochee" in concluding that Ionian Glow's damages could include
the servicemen's settlement. 6 The Chattahoochee involved a mutual
fault collision between a schooner and a steamship in which the schooner
sank while carrying valuable cargo. 7 A statute, the Harter Act,"
precluded the cargo owner from recovering against the carrying vessel.3 9
The cargo owner, however, recovered a judgment for damages against
the noncarrying vessel owner, the other party to the collision." The
Supreme Court permitted the noncarrying vessel owner to include this
settlement in the divided damages apportionment between the carrying
vessel owner and the noncarrying vessel owner." Despite the provisions
of the Harter Act limiting liability, the Supreme Court followed the ad-
miralty rule of divided damages and held the carrying vessel indirectly
liable.2
The Fourth Circuit also examined the Supreme Court's decision in
remedy for claims of servicemen injured incident to service. Id. at 146. The Fourth Circuit
agreed that servicemen cannot bring actions against the government under the FTCA for
injuries sustained incident to service. 670 F.2d at 463. The Ionian Glow court, however,
recognized that the present claim involved the PVA and the appropriate admiralty law, not
the FTCA and its exception. Id.; see Lane v. United States, 529 F.2d 175, 179 (4th Cir. 1975);
DeBardeleben Marine Corp. v. United States, 451 F.2d 140, 146 (5th Cir. 1971).
See 670 F.2d at 463; 46 U.S.C. § 781 (1976). In drafting the PVA, Congress intended
to impose on the United States the same liability as imposed by admiralty on a private
shipowner. See Allen v. United States, 338 F.2d 160, 162 (9th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 380
U.S. 961 (1965); Ira S. Bushey & Sons, Inc. v. United States, 276 F. Supp. 518, 523 (E.D.N.Y.
1967), affd, 398 F.2d 167 (2d Cir. 1968).
670 F.2d at 463.
173 U.S. 540 (1899).
670 F.2d at 463-64.
173 U.S. at 541-42. In The Chattahoochee, the collision between the schooner and the
steamship resulted in a total loss of the schooner, including all property and cargo aboard.
Id. at 542. In the collision, the steamship escaped undamaged. Id.
46 U.S.C. §§ 190-95 (1976). The Harter Act provides that cargo owners cannot collect
directly from the carrying vessels for damages arising from collisions based on faults in
navigation. Id. § 192.
"' 173 U.S. at 552.
'o 173 U.S. at 552-55.
" Id. at 552-53; cf. The Delaware, 161 U.S. 459, 472 (1896) (Harter Act, which had no ap-
plication to collision between two vessels, modified relations previously existing between
vessel and its cargo); The Manitoba, 122 U.S. 97, 111 (1887) (all damages incurred by both
vessels added together and equally divided).
', 173 U.S. at 554-55. The rule of mutual liability between parties states that in mutual
fault collisions, the shipowners proportionally divide the entire damage to both ships. Id.
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Weyerhaeuser Steamship Co. v. United States43 which extended the rule
in The Chattahoochee." In Weyerhaeuser, the Court examined a mutual
fault collision between a private vessel and an army dredge in which a
government employee sustained an injury.45 After the private vessel
owner settled a claim brought by the government employee, the Court
permitted the calculation of the settlement into the divided damages ap-
portionment.
46
The Fourth Circuit relied on the Supreme Court's rationale in The
Chattahoochee and Weyerhaeuser in concluding that the settled ad-
miralty doctrine of divided damages must prevail over a statutory provis-
ion limiting liability. In Ionian Glow, the Fourth Circuit recognized the
distinction between common law and admiralty in applying the uniform
maritime principle of divided damages.48 A distinction traditionally ex-
ists between admiralty and common-law remedies. 49 The United States
'3 372 U.S. 597 (1963).
670 F.2d at 463; see supra text accompanying notes 35-42.
's 372 U.S. at 598. In Weyerhaeuser, a civil service employee sustained personal in-
juries in the collision. Id. The employees received compensation under the Federal
Employees' Compensation Act (FECA) and then filed suit against Weyerhaeuser Steamship
Co. to recover damages. Id.; see 5 U.S.C. § 8102 (1976) (criteria for compensation award).
Weyerhaeuser subsequently settled the lawsuit with the employee, who then repaid the
United States the amount which he received as statutory compensation, as required by the
FECA. 372 U.S. at 508; see 5 U.S.C. § 8132 (1976) (section providing for adjustment after
recovery from a third person).
48 372 U.S. at 604. The Supreme Court reasoned that the Public Vessels Act, under
which the plaintiff in Weyerhaeuser made his claim, imposes the same liability on the
government that admiralty law imposes on the private shipowner. Id. at 600; see 46 U.S.C.
§ 781 (1976). The Weyerhaeuser Court stated that a private shipowner remains liable for
half of the damages, including the settlement to the federal employee. 372 U.S. at 603-04.
The Court rejected the government's argument that FECA limited the liability of the
government by providing an exclusive administrative remedy for injured federal
employees. Id. at 600. the Court stated that no evidence existed that Congress, in for-
mulating FECA, considered the rights of unrelated third parties such as the private vessel
owner. Id. at 601. In accordance with the admiralty rule of divided damages, the Court con-
cluded that FECA did not preclude the private vessel owner from including payments made
to the government employee in the overall settlement. Id. at 603-04. The Weyerhaeuser
Court broadened the divided damages rule of The Chattahoochee by including a settlement
made to an injured third party as a proper item of damage. Id.
4' 670 F.2d at 463. In Ionian Glow, the Fourth Circuit applied admiralty law to circum-
vent the Veteran's Benefits Act. Id.
" 670 F.2d at 463-64.
'9 Id.; see Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc., 398 U.S. 375, 386 (1970). In Moragne,
the Court recognized that maritime law existed as a thing apart from the common law. 398
U.S. at 386; cf. The Harrisburg, 119 U.S. 199, 205 (1866), rev'd, 398 U.S. 375 (1970). In The
Harrisburg, the Supreme Court held that the maritime law did not provide a different
remedy than that applied at common law. Id. The Supreme Court, however, overruled the
Harrisburg decision in Moragne v. States Marine Lines, 398 U.S. at 408-09. In Moragne, the
Court ruled that the uniformity of maritime law necessitated the reversal of the decision in
The Harrisburg. Id. at 386-87, 409. See generally J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITU-
TION OF THE UNITED STATES, § 1666 (4th ed. 1873).
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Constitution expressly recognizes the existence of a separate body of
maritime law. The constitutional grant of admiralty jurisdiction to the
federal courts presupposes the existence of a prevailing body of ad-
miralty.-" The primacy of admiralty doctrine derives from precedents in-
volving ship collisions.2 In allowing the inclusion of the servicemen's set-
tlement in the division of damages, the Fourth Circuit applied the
reasoning of the Supreme Court in The Chattahoochee that the rule of
divided damages controls.
Prior to Ionian Glow, the Fourth Circuit had examined maritime
cases involving the application of the divided damages rule in mutual
fault collisions. 4 Typically, the Fourth Circuit had divided the total
damages resulting from a mutual fault collision.5 In addition, the Fourth
Circuit had held that a statute limiting liability does not bar third-party
claims for indemnity. Although Ionian Glow did not entail an indemnity
suit per se, Ionian Glow did involve a similar type of governmental
1 See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1. The Supreme Court consistently has decided that
a separate body of admiralty as recognized in the Constitution exists aside from the com-
mon law. See, e.g., Romero v. International Terminal Operating Co., 358 U.S. 354, 373 (1959)
(state law must yield to needs of uniform federal maritime law); The Western Maid, 257 U.S.
419, 435 (1928) (admiralty jurisprudence as adopted by Constitution is distinct from common
law and courts must preserve integrity of admiralty principles); American Ins. Co. v.
Canter, 7 U.S. (1 Pet.) 685, 690 (1828) (admiralty law as separate body of legal doctrine is as
old as navigation itself).
51 See ROBERTSON, ADMIRALTY AND FEDERALISM 138 (1970). See generally Deutsch,
Development of the Theory of Admiralty Jurisdiction in the United States, 35 TUL. L. REV.
116, 118-19 (1960).
1 See, e.g., The Max Morris, 137 U.S. 1, 9 (1890) (collision in which damages to injured
passenger apportioned equally between two vessels involved); The Atlas, 93 U.S. 302, 317
(1876) (Supreme Court distinguished common law from admiralty which provides for appor-
tionment of entire loss in collision cases); The Alabama, 92 U.S. 695, 696 (1875) (each party in
collision must pay proportionate share of damages).
670 F.2d at 464.
u See Harbor Towing Corp. v. S.S. Calmar, 507 F.2d 720, 720 (4th Cir. 1974) (per
curiam) (collision between ship and tug). The Fourth Circuit consistently has applied the
divided damages rule in mutual fault collisions. See also Partenreederei M.S. Bernd
Leonhardt v. United States, 393 F.2d 756, 759 (4th Cir. 1968) (collision between American
vessel and German vessel); Thomson v. United States, 226 F.2d 852, 856 (4th Cir. 1959) (col-
lision between private yacht and improperly marked United States wreckage).
' See Harbor Towing Corp. v. S.S. Calmar, 507 F.2d 720, 720 (4th Cir. 1974) (per
curiam) (law requires assessment of one-half of total damages against each vessel); United
States v. S.S. Washington, 241 F.2d 819, 825 (4th Cir. 1957) (damages resulting from collision
between private tank and United States destroyer divided equally). Following the Supreme
Court's holding in United States v. Reliable Transfer, however, the Fourth Circuit now
divides damages in mutual fault collisions based on the comparative degree of fault of each
party involved. See 427 U.S. 397 (1975); supra note 1 (tracing evolution of divided damages
rule).
' See Wallenius Bremen G.m.b.H. v. United States, 409 F.2d 994, 998 (4th Cir. 1969)
(exclusive remedy provision is not per se bar to tortfeasor action for indemnity from
government); United States v. The S.S. Washington, 172 F. Supp. 905, 909 (E.D. Va. 1959)
(United States liable for statutory death benefits, indemnity, and compensation).
1983]
WASHINGTON AND LEE LA W REVIEW
claim of immunity." The Fourth Circuit found that Ionian Glow could
receive compensation for its payments to the servicemen regardless of
the Veteran's Benefits Act. 8 The division of damages, in effect, allowed
Ionian Glow to require the Government to bear a portion of the settle-
ment with the servicemen. 9
The Fourth Circuit's analysis in Ionian Glow presents an alternative
view regarding the claims of servicemen." By circumventing the
Veteran's Benefits Act, the Ionian Glow court held the Government in-
directly liable." As a matter of course, servicemen's claims against the
government routinely proceed under specific compensation statutes.62
The Fourth Circuit previously has allowed the claim of a third party for
indemnity against the federal government for damages paid to an in-
jured government employee. 3 Relying on the primacy of admiralty doc-
' 670 F.2d at 463. In Ionian Glow, the government claimed an immunity associated
with the Veteran's Benefits Act. Id. By asserting that the servicemen's claims should pro-
ceed under the Veteran's Benefits Act, the government sought to escape liability. Id.
670 F.2d at 463. Relying on the historic primacy of admiralty doctrine, the Fourth
Circuit reasoned in Ionian Glow that the items of damages in divided damages appor-
tionments should include payments made to injured servicemen. Id. Since the servicemen
did not sue the United States directly, no bar existed to the third-party claimant. Id. The
servicemen's remedy ordinarily would proceed under a compensation statute. Id. Since
Ionian Glow settled with the servicemen, however, the shipowners deserved reimburse-
ment because of the divided damages rule. Id.; see supra notes 49 & 50 (describing admiralty
as separate body of law).
' Id.; cf. Empire Seafoods, Inc. v. Anderson, 398 F.2d 204, 218 (5th Cir.) (each responsi-
ble party 'liable for one-half damages to injured third party), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 983
(1968). In division of damages between a shipowner and a bridge owner, both at fault in a
collision, the shipowner, on paying damages to two injured employees, may treat the pay-
ment as part of its collision damages. Id. at 217. The shipowner, in turn, can recover from
the bridge owner one-half of the settlement paid to the injured employees. Id.
' 670 F.2d at 463.
61 Id.; see supra notes 22-24 (discussion of servicemen's rights under compensation
schemes as opposed to general statutes such as Federal Tort Claims Act). In Ionian Glow,
the servicemen sustained their injuries during activities incident to their duties. 670 F.2d at
463. The application of admiralty law circumvents the Veteran's Benefits Act, which would
have authorized compensation instead. Id.; cf. Brooks v. United States, 337 U.S. 49, 51 (1949)
(servicemen allowed to proceed under Federal Tort Claims Act provided injuries not inci-
dent to service).
"2 See 38 U.S.C. § 331 (1976). But see Weyerhaeuser S.S. Co. v. United States, 372 U.S.
597, 601 n.5 (1963). The inadequacy of benefits under compensation statutes, however, has
tended to cause federal employees to seek relief under general statutes such as the Federal
Tort Claims Act. Id.
' See Wallenius Bremen G.m.b.H. v. United States, 409 F.2d 994, 998 (4th Cir. 1969).
The Wallenius Bremen court dealt with a third-party indemnity claim arising from an in-
jury sustained by a federal employee on a private ship. Id. Although the Ionian Glow case
did not involve indemnity per se, the reasoning applied remains similar. See 670 F.2d at
463-64. In Wallenius Bremen, the Fourth Circuit reasoned that in the law of torts, indemnity
embraces primary and secondary liability. 409 F.2d at 998. Indemnity shifts the entire loss
to one whose fault is primary and relatively more grievous. Id. Aside from an express con-
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trine, the Fourth Circuit reasoned in Wallenius Bremen G.m.b.H. v.
United States" that a statutory provision should not bar a third-party in-
demnity claim." The Wallenius Bremen court reasoned that no bar ap-
pears when a third party's right of action against the United States
arises out of an independent duty owed by the government to the third
party.6 In Ionian Glow, the Fourth Circuit extended the analysis to en-
compass the claims of servicemen by relying on admiralty doctrine. 7
The Fourth Circuit's holding in Ionian Glow is consistent with the
decisions of other circuits.' Courts generally apply the divided damages
rule in mutual fault collisions. 9 In addition, courts have followed the
Supreme Court's reasoning in Weyerhaeuser that statutes enacted to
tract, indemnity applies only if the person owed a duty to the injured person. Id. The
Fourth Circuit, however, reasoned that the purpose of indemnity is to shift the burden to
the wrongdoer whose conduct is more blameworthy. Id. The fact that the wrongdoer
employed a defense, such as a statute limiting liability, seemed irrelevant. Id. The Fourth
Circuit permitted a suit by a shipowner against the United States on the theory that the
government's fault appeared primary and its duty extended both to the other party to the
collision, the shipowner, and to the injured person. Id. In Ionian Glow, the United States
possessed a duty toward the M/V Star Light, Ionian Glow's ship, and its own servicemen.
See generally 1 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS § 10.2, at 718 (1956).
0' 409 F.2d 994 (4th Cir. 1969); see supra note 23 (differences between indemnity suits
and admiralty).
1 409 F.2d at 995. The Wallenius Bremen case involved an action for indemnity
against the United States by a shipowner, Wallenius Bremen, a German corporation, which
settled a claim brought against it by an injured federal employee. Id. The federal employee
sustained a severe injury when he fell from an accommodation ladder between Wallenius
Bremen's ship and the dock. Id. The shipowner sought indemnity from the United States
after the settlement of the federal employee's suit on the ground that the United States
should have known that the federal employee was unfit for such work. Id.
Id. at 995-96.
6? See 670 F.2d at 463.
E.g.., Nutt v. Loomis Hydraulic Testing Co., 552 F.2d 1126, 1134-35 (5th Cir. 1977)
(indemnity granted on basis of divided damages rule in collision between two vessels);
Oliver J. Olson & Co. v. American S.S. Marine Leopard, 356 F.2d 728, 737 (9th Cir. 1966)
(liability of shipowners to third-party claimants in mutual fault collision regarded joint and
several); cf. United Air Lines, Inc. v. Weiner, 335 F.2d 379 (9th Cir. 1964). In Weiner, the
Ninth Circuit denied a claim for indemnity from the United States regarding the wrongful
death claim of several government employees and military personnel. Id. at 380. The Ninth
Circuit, in denying indemnity, relied on the exclusivity provision of FECA and the principle
in Feres. Id.; see supra text accompanying notes 19 & 20. The Weiner court, however,
recognized a fundamental distinction between the rule of indemnity and the rule of divided
damages in mutual fault collisions. 335 F.2d at 380. The Ninth Circuit agreed that in a mutual
fault collision, a basic right exists to the apportionment of all damages. Id. The Weiner
court recognized that such a right arises from the duty which each shipowner has toward
the other to navigate safely. Id.
" See, e.g., Skibs A/S Siljestad v. S.S. Mathew Luckenbach, 324 F.2d 563, 564 (2d Cir.
1963) (per curiam) (general rule provides for division of costs in a mutual fault case); Tank
Barge Hygrade v. The Gatco New Jersey, 250 F.2d 485, 488 (3d Cir. 1957) (collision between
diesel tanker and barge pushed by tug); Sea-Land Service, Inc. v. Eagle Terminal Tankers,
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limit liability fail in favor of other remedies such as general maritime
provisions or indemnity suits." Other courts have recognized the
primacy of admiralty doctrine over statutory provisions." As the Ionian
Glow court reasoned, the admiralty rule of divided damages possesses
special historical significance, and therefore becomes distinguishable
from the ordinary rule of indemnity. 2
A practical consequence of Ionian Glow is that vessel owners can in-
clude settlements to servicemen in divided damages apportionments.3
In addition, servicemen possess a different recourse other than ad-
ministrative claims under compensation statutes. 4 After Ionian Glow,
servicemen may pursue causes of action against private vessel owners,
who, in turn, can obtain compensation from the government in divided
damages."
The Supreme Court's decisions in The Chattahoochee and Weyer-
haeuser provide strong precedent for the Fourth Circuit's holding in
Ionian Glow.78 The Ionian Glow decision also is consistent with prior
Fourth Circuit cases. 7 7 These cases support the Fourth Circuit's exten-
sion of the divided damages rule to permit the calculation of the ser-
vicemen's settlement into the divided damages apportionment. The
Fourth Circuit's decision in Ionian Glow Marine, Inc. v. United States
presents a novel approach to servicemen's compensation claims that is
consistent with established principles of maritime law.
PAUL J. KENNEDY
Inc., 443 F. Supp. 532, 534 (W.D. Wash. 1977) (parties in mutual fault share all probable
damages equally); see also supra note 51 (series of Supreme Court decisions applying divided
damages rule).
10 See, e.g., Roberts v. United States, 498 F.2d 520, 525 (9th Cir.) (jurisdiction under
FTCA and general maritime provisions is mutually exclusive), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1070
(1974); Padgett v. Moore-McCormack Lines, 442 F. Supp. 1036, 1038 (W.D. Wash. 1977) (ex-
clusive remedy provision of FECA did not bar third-party indemnity action); Malgren v.
United States, 390 F. Supp. 154, 156 (W.D. Mich. 1975) (administratrix of estate of deceased
seaman was proper party and not barred by statute).
"' See Lane v. United States, 529 F.2d 175, 180 (4th Cir. 1975) (provisions of admiralty
supercede provisions of FTCA); DeBardeleben Marine Corp. v. United States, 451 F.2d 140,
146 (5th Cir. 1971) (application of FTCA over admiralty provision produces irrational and
unintentional distinctions).
' 670 F.2d at 464; see supra text accompanying notes 48-53 (explanation of historical
distinction between admiralty and common law).
" 670 F.2d at 463; see supra text accompanying notes 60-67 (discussion of interaction
between statutes and third-party claims).
" 670 F.2d at 463; see supra note 58 (discussion of servicemen's remedies).
75 Id.; see supra note 46 (discussion of third-party settlements in divided damages).
7' Id.; see supra text accompanying notes 35-47 (discussion of two leading Supreme
Court cases).
" See supra notes 54 & 55 (discussion of applicable Fourth Circuit cases).
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